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Recent migration fromMuslim-majority countries has sparked discussions across Europe
about the supposed threat posed by new immigrants. Young men make up the
largest share of newly arrived immigrants and this demographic is often perceived to
be particularly threatening. In this article, we compare pro-sociality and trust toward
immigrants from Muslim-majority countries, focusing on gender differences in treatment.
We study these questions using behavioral games that measure strategic (trusting) and
non-strategic (pro-social) behavior. Our data comes from measures embedded in a large
survey of residents of Germany’s eastern regions, where anti-immigrant sentiments are
high. We find that Germans are similarly pro-social toward immigrant men and women
in non-strategic situations, but are significantly less likely to trust immigrant men (but
not women) in strategic encounters. These findings provide evidence that immigrants’
gender can be an important factor conditioning the behavior of the majority population,
but also caution that (gendered) ethnic discrimination may be situationally dependent.
Future research should further examine the exact mechanisms underlying this variation
in discriminatory behavior.
Keywords: immigration, ingroup favoritism, pro-social behavior, trust, gendered ethnic discrimination, Germany,
behavioral games, experiment
1. INTRODUCTION
According to official estimates, 3.21 million migrants have sought asylum in the European Union
during the 2014–2016 refugee crisis, a number unprecedented in recent history (Eurostat, 2017).
This sudden inflow in turn generated a heated public debate, aroused anti-immigrant sentiments,
and fueled the rise of right-wing populism (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Geiges, 2018;
Frey, 2020). Standard accounts explain these developments as reactions to rapid cultural change
or demographic threats associated with the arrival of large Muslim populations (Hangartner
et al., 2019). However, recent research suggests that an important element underlying exclusionary
reactions is that many of these arrivals were young and male (OECD, 2017; Eurostat, 2018). While
this demographic often shows high economic potential, it is also frequently viewed as a particularly
potent security and cultural threat by some members of the public (Ward, 2019).
Against this backdrop, the present article asks: to what extent are anti-immigrant reactions
specifically conditioned on the gender of new arrivals?
To address this question, we present results from behavioral games embedded within a
large survey on attitudes toward immigrants and refugees in Germany’s eastern region, an area
where anti-immigrant sentiments are running high, as manifested in levels of support for the
populist right.
We included two standard games: the Dictator Game and the Trust Game. These games are
commonly used as workhorse models to assess strategic and non-strategic interactions. Tomeasure
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discrimination, we randomly varied the gender and ethnicity
(German vs. Middle Eastern) of interaction partners. In addition,
we also introduced a Split Game in which respondents had
to allocate a fixed amount of money between two recipients:
one ethnic German and one of immigrant origin. This game
captures the common situation in which an individual must
choose between natives and immigrants in the allocation of
scarce commodities (e.g., access to public housing, educational
programs, health services). Discrimination is measured here in
terms of deviation from an even 50-50 split between an in-group
and out-group member of the same gender.
Overall, different patterns of behavior emerge across our three
behavioral games. We do not find any discrimination in the
Dictator Game, but record significant anti-immigrant bias in
both the Trust and Split Games. Further, we uncover evidence
of a gender-specific discrimination effect in the Trust Game:
when the decision to trust is motivated by strategic beliefs about
one’s interaction partner, our participants are significantly less
likely to trust immigrant men. In contrast, our results indicate
that immigrant men are not especially penalized in non-strategic
interactions. In sum, our mixed results highlight the importance
of conceptually differentiating different interaction contexts
when understanding the conditions under which (gendered)
discrimination occurs.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
2.1. Discrimination in Intergroup Relations
Discrimination in intergroup relations is commonly approached
from the perspective of Social Identity Theory, which argues that
humans have a psychological disposition for social categorization
and differentiation between in-group and out-group members
(Tajfel et al., 1979; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008; Balliet et al.,
2014). The main finding of this literature is that individuals have
a tendency to display in-group bias, and are thus more likely to
extend pro-social behavior to members of their own group rather
than to out-group members.
This literature has convincingly documented how ingroup
favoritism can emerge even in minimal group experiments with
arbitrary distinctions between groups (e.g., preferences over
paintings) (Oakes and Turner, 1980). We may therefore expect
to see similar patterns in real-life situations. Recent applications
of Social Identity Theory have posited that ethnic differences
constitute salient group boundaries in contemporary European
societies (Winter and Zhang, 2018; Bourabain and Verhaeghe,
2019; Choi et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). As such, we
expect that:
(H1) Host population members are more pro-social toward in-
group members than toward out-group members (individuals of
immigrant origin).
2.2. Gender and Discrimination
Although Social Identity Theory provides a plausible mechanism
linking ethnic differences to discrimination, it offers only limited
insight on the interplay between ethnicity and gender. For that,
we must turn to two additional theoretical perspectives. First,
building from evolutionary theory, Navarrete et al. (2010) have
developed an “outgroup-male-target” hypothesis suggesting that
the basis for discrimination and prejudice stems from outgroup
threats in intergroup conflict. Since this conflict has been
largely perpetuated by male aggressors in human evolutionary
history, these authors argue that discrimination will be targeted
specifically against outgroup men.
Furthermore, another approach leading to the same
expectation—that of more negative out-group bias toward young
immigrant men—points to the argument that young men are
more likely to commit certain hideous and violent crimes (or
are at least more likely to be perceived as doing so), and are thus
feared more (Gambetta and Hertog, 2017; Ward, 2019).
This line of research is closely related to social-psychological
work on the Integrated Threat Theory, which has linked negative
attitudes and prejudice toward immigrants to different types
of threat, including realistic and symbolic threat (Stephan and
Stephan, 2018)1. Even if immigrants do not commit crimes at a
higher rate than natives (Feltes et al., 2018), adding more people
of this potentially “risky” demographic may per se be a reason for
natives to perceive immigrant men as a greater security threat.
Lastly, research has also shown that immigrant groups
with many young men from Muslim-majority countries are
significantly more likely to be perceived as a cultural threat
(Ward, 2019). This aligns with cross-country survey evidence
(e.g., the World Value Survey) that suggests that cultural values
in Muslim-majority countries are on average more distant from
Western European societies than those in other common regions
of origin (e.g., Eastern Europe) (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
Furthermore, scholarship on immigrant assimilation has also
shown that sociocultural variables such as conservative gender
and family values among immigrants from Muslim-majority
countries are an alternative source of unexplained ethnic group
differences in terms of integration outcomes among immigrants
in Europe (Koopmans, 2016). At the same time, discrimination
based on the widespread belief among natives that these gender
norms are incompatible with liberal ideas of gender equality
has added to the marginalization of even second-generation
Muslim immigrants and especially of young Muslim men (Adida
et al., 2016; Drouhot and Nee, 2019), who are often perceived as
instrumental in upholding these values (Higgins, 2015).
Applying these perspectives to our context, we define gender-
specific discrimination as referring to the phenomenon that
immigrant men tend to receive worse treatment than native men,
while immigrant women are treated the same as native women.
We expect that:
(H2) Host population members discriminate more against
immigrant men compared to native men than against immigrant
women compared to native women.
2.3. Discrimination in Behavioral Games
In order to study discrimination, the literature has increasingly
turned to experimental designs. In particular, behavioral games
have been developed to study universal patterns of human
1We understand prejudice here as biased beliefs, thoughts, and attitudes about a
group of people. Discrimination is defined as differential behavior toward a specific
group of people based on their ethnicity and gender.
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behavior and identify and compare mechanisms, such as
altruism, trust and cooperation across individuals or groups
(Berg et al., 1995). These have also been used “in the field”
(Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004; Abascal, 2015; Baldassarri and
Abascal, 2017; Schaub, 2017).
The controlled experimental setting allows scholars to
manipulate aspects of the game, such as the identity of the players
involved, allowing researchers to obtain behavioral measures of
ingroup bias (Schaub et al., 2020a). For example, Adida et al.
(2016) used behavioral games with French natives and Muslim
and Christian immigrants from Senegal to examine religious
discrimination in France. They found that natives showed lower
unconditional altruism (but not lower trust) toward Senegalese
Muslims in comparison to Senegalese Christians. Along the
same lines, Cettolin and Suetens (2019) employed a Trust
Game (described below) with a representative sample of the
Dutch population, and find that Dutch natives behave more
opportunistically toward non-natives.
While our article is closely related to these previous studies,
our primary contribution is to focus attention on the intersection
of gender and ethnicity in evaluating discrimination effects.
Further, we aim to understand how patterns of gendered
discrimination vary across different game contexts. Previous
research has documented discrimination in some games but not
others (Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004; Adida et al., 2016; Cettolin
and Suetens, 2019; Baldassarri et al., 2020), suggesting that a
closer examination of themechanisms underlying discrimination
is warranted.
3. METHODS
3.1. Research Setting and Sample
To evaluate these hypotheses, we turn to behavioral games
embedded within a large-scale survey that we fielded between
March and June 2018. The survey was implemented by the CATI
Lab at the University of Jena2. Our data comprises a random
sample of 1,243 native Germans from more than 200 rural
municipalities or small towns in all five states of the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR) who agreed to participate
in an incentivized online-survey on the topic of “Community and
Society in Germany.”3 For more details on our sampling strategy,
see Schaub et al. (2020b)4.
2Prior to data collection, the study received ethical approval from the Ethics
committee of the grant hosting institution (Bocconi University).
3The average population of the municipalities in our sample is 3,116 with an
average population density of 59 persons/km2. We excluded 46 individuals with
a migration background and 31 individuals that were subject to a randomization
error in terms of the profiles shown from our analyses. The results presented below
are robust to using the full sample.
4The respondents were from closely-matched municipalities, half of which
received refugees in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis. Our starting population
were all municipalities in the Eastern German Bundesländer of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Thüringen and Sachsen. A matching
strategy at the municipality level (excluding municipalities with foreigner shares
above 1.5% and less than 6.6 km distance between them) allowed us to study how
local exposure to refugees affects right-wing support, which we report in Schaub
et al. (2020b). We find that refugee allocation has no effect on immigrant attitudes
and voting behavior. With regards to our analyses here, we find similar treatment
Our study is situated in a context that is fairly common,
politically important, but rarely studied: the rural hinterlands
of a country, where the presence of foreigners is low, but anti-
immigrant sentiments are widespread. In such areas, right-
wing populists have continuously increased their vote shares,
often mobilizing their voters with an anti-immigrant platform
(Alba and Foner, 2017). Our study area is no exception to this
trend: between the two general elections (2013 and 2017) that
bracketed the onset of the “refugee crisis,” support for Germany’s
populist right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
surged from 6 to 25%.
Participants were first recruited by phone based on a random
sample of telephone numbers using a protocol that allowed
targeting specific zip-code areas. During the call, participants
were invited to answer an online survey and to take part in
the behavioral games on a website that we programmed for
this purpose using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). The survey took
an average of 30 min, and participants received a variable
compensation of 10–20 Euros (2–4 times the federal hourly
minimum wage), with the exact amount depending on their
decisions in the behavioral games.
Overall, 47% of the sample was male, and the median age was
53 years (which is slightly older than the East German average
of around 46 years). Forty-three percent of the sample had a
university-qualifying high school education (Abitur). In terms
of political alignment, 11% reported having voted for the AfD
in the 2017 National Elections. This number is lower than the
regional average of 25%, indicating that our sample appears to be
less xenophobic than the typical voter in the area. Nonetheless,
right-wing attitudes were also common in the sample, with 38%
of our respondents supporting the statement that “foreigners
only come to exploit the welfare system,” and 36% endorsing the
position that “child support should only be paid to Germans.”
Table 1 presents a full description of sample demographics and
the summary statistics for the different behavioral games.
3.2. Description of Behavioral Games
To evaluate our hypotheses, we employed a variety of behavioral
games. Survey respondents first participated in a Dictator Game
(DG) in which they were provided with an endowment of
5 EUR and asked to decide how much of this money they
wanted to give to another individual (Alter). Participants kept
the difference between the endowment and the amount of money
they gave to Alter. Since an individual’s payoff in this game
depends upon his/her choice alone, the DG has been commonly
understood to capture pro-social behavior motivated by non-
strategic considerations such as altruism or inequality aversion
(Camerer, 2011).
Second, respondents took part in a Trust Game (TG) (Berg
et al., 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000; Gereke et al., 2018). This game is
similar to theDG in that participants also received an endowment
of 5 EUR which they could share with an Alter. However, every
EUR the participant chooses to share is multiplied (in our case
doubled) by the researchers before being passed to Alter. Finally,
effects in the behavioral games for people living in municipalities with and without
refugees (results not shown).
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TABLE 1 | Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Behavioral Game Outcomes
Amount Sent in Dictator Game 2.398 1.579 0 5 2,486
Amount Sent by Ego in Trust Game 2.800 1.592 0 5 2,486
Difference in Split Game: Amount Given to −0.293 1.545 −5 5 1,243
Minority Alter Minus Amount Given to Native Alter
Age 52.549 13.985 18 88 1,243
Male 0.47 0.499 0 1 1,243
Education
Abitur 0.427 0.495 0 1 1,243
Realschule or Fachhochschulreife 0.526 0.500 0 1 1,243
Hauptschule or lower 0.047 0.211 0 1 1,243
Employment Status
Full-time employed 0.498 0.500 0 1 1,231
Part-time employed 0.180 0.384 0 1 1,231
Other status 0.323 0.468 0 1 1,231
Party voted for in 2017 national election
CDU 0.256 0.436 0 1 1,150
SPD 0.155 0.362 0 1 1,150
LINKE 0.211 0.408 0 1 1,150
AfD 0.122 0.327 0 1 1,150
GREENS 0.082 0.274 0 1 1,150
Rightwing Attitudes
Foreigners only exploit welfare state 3.798 1.768 1 7 1,122
Only Germans should receive child
support
3.648 2.193 1 7 1,098
Alter then decides howmuch of this money should be passed back
to the participant. Since the money is doubled in the game, it
is possible for the participant to gain more then s/he possessed
initially – but only if Alter returns more than what was sent.
The trust game therefore captures the features highlighted in
Coleman (1994)’s definition of trust, namely that (1) the decision
of trust is voluntary; (2) the decisions of the truster and Alter
(the trustee) are sequential; (3) only if the truster shows trust
can the trustee decide to abuse the demonstrated trust; (4) the
truster becomes vulnerable to exploitation by showing trust.
Figure 1 presents a screenshot of how the game was explained
to respondents.
The Trust Game differs importantly from the DG in that it
introduces an element of strategic calculation: if the participant
believes that Alter is trustworthy (i.e., that he/she will pass some
of the money back), it makes sense to send money in the first
place as this increases the size of the pie to be shared. However,
if the participant believes that Alter is untrustworthy (i.e., that
he/she will keep all of the money), then it is rational to send
nothing. We measure discrimination by comparing the amounts
of money that immigrant Alters are sent compared to native
Alters, and we can evaluate gender- specific discrimination by
comparing the results for immigrant female Alters compared to
native female Alters and immigrant male Alters compared to
native male Alters.
FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of the Trust Game explanation.
While the DG and TG are commonly employed to capture
elements of two-party strategic and non-strategic behavior, we
also implemented a Split Game (SG) to capture situations where
the participant must decide how to allocate resources (10 EUR)
between two different Alters (Peterson, 2016). This game differs
from the DG and TG in that the participant’s own payoff is
unaffected by his/her decision. This is an important difference
because it eliminates self-regarding preferences or egoism, and
thus provides a measure of discrimination that is less likely to
be confounded or biased by other mechanisms. Moreover, the
SG allows for direct comparison between in- and out-group
members, while the DG and TG provide information regarding
preferences for only one Alter in each round. Importantly, the
direct comparison of two individuals in the SG also mirrors
more closely a range of situations where decision-makers have
to make a choice between two individuals (i.e., between two job
candidates who compete for one position).
3.3. Treatment Manipulations
Participants were randomly presented with information about
different Alters on which they could condition their decision in
each of the games. Each Alter profile contained a picture, as well
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FIGURE 2 | Screenshot example of German and immigrant profiles in the Dictator Games.
as basic information such as Alter’s name, age (between 29 and 34
years) and federal state of residence (see Figure 2). By providing
pictures and using stereotypical German vs. Middle Eastern
names, we could manipulate perceptions of Alter’s gender and
immigrant origin. Overall, we drew upon a set of profiles from
eight individual Alters that were carefully selected on gender,
age, ethnicity, and physical appearance. This selection was based
on the results from a pre-test with a total of 37 pictures on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) where we had the photos
rated in terms of perceived expressed emotions (happy, angry,
fearful, sad, neutral) and attractiveness. These are factors known
to influence facial cues for trustworthiness and cooperative
decisions (Todorov et al., 2015). Our final sample consisted
of four ethnic Germans (two male and two female) and four
individuals with migration background (again two male and two
female) who were closely matched across all perceived traits5,6.
Participants played two rounds of both the DG and the TG:
once with a German Alter and once with an immigrant Alter. We
randomized the order in which profiles were shown (i.e., 50%
of participants encountered an immigrant Alter first, while the
remainder encountered a German Alter first) in order to account
for potential order effects (e.g., participants might become, in
general, less altruistic over time). We also randomized the Alters’
gender across the two profiles. This design allows us to measure
(gendered) discrimination by estimating how behavior in the
DG and TG changes as a response to the interaction of Alters’
gender and ethnicity. Further, because we employ a within-
subjects design, we can include respondent-level fixed effects in
our models.
Randomization of profiles in the Split Game (SG) proceeded
somewhat differently: here participants were shown two profiles
5For the two immigrant women, we included pictures both with and without a
Muslim headscarf (hijab), since approximately 28% ofMuslimwomen in Germany
report wearing a headscarf (Haug et al., 2009). Overall, we did not find any
significant penalty for immigrant women wearing headscarves and therefore pool
the immigrant women profiles in our analyses.
6The pre-test participants whose pictures we used as “Alter” in the behavioral
games were paid the average amounts handed to them by the survey respondents
after the completion of the survey.
side-by-side, one of a (randomly-chosen) German Alter and
the other depicting a (randomly-chosen) immigrant Alter. The
left-right placement of German vs. immigrant profiles on the
screen was also randomized. However, we constrained the
randomization such that both Alters had to be of the same
gender. Since the two profiles are shown together, participants
played the SG only once, and we measure discrimination as
deviation from an even 50-50 split in favor of the German Alter.
4. RESULTS
Results for all three games were analyzed using linear regression
models estimated by OLS. For models involving the DG and
TG, standard errors are clustered at the individual level because
respondents made two decisions each. Huber-White robust
standard errors are used in SG models7.
To test H1, we first compare the amount sent to native vs.
immigrant Alters in the DG and TG. Results are presented
graphically in Figure 3, while statistical tests with respondent
fixed-effects to account for our within-subjects design are
reported in Model 1 of Tables 2, 3. Native Alters in the
DG received 2.42 EUR on average, while immigrant Alters
received 2.38 EUR. This difference is substantively small, and
not statistically significant at conventional levels. In contrast,
immigrant Alters did receive significantly smaller offers in the TG
(2.87 EUR for native Alters compared to 2.74 EUR for immigrant
Alters), and the effect is statistically significant at p < 0.001.
Both DG and TG results remain robust after controlling for the
order in which Alters’ pictures were displayed (see Model 2 in
Tables 2, 3).
Finally, we turn to discrimination in the SG by examining
the extent to which monetary distributions differ from an even
split (see Figure 3). This inequality is captured in the constant
term in Model 1 in Table 4. This model simply estimates the
average deviation from 50-50, such that a statistically insignificant
coefficient on the constant term indicates that splits are not
7We additionally present all regression results with standardized regression
coefficients in Tables S1–S3 in the Supplementary Materials.
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FIGURE 3 | The difference in the amount of money (in EUR) shared with immigrants compared to natives in three behavioral games: the Dictator Game, the Trust
Game, and the Split Game. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
TABLE 2 | Amount of money (in EUR) sent to Alter in the Dictator Games.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrant Alter −0.036 −0.029 −0.033 0.037 0.050
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.062) (0.061)
Male Alter −0.196∗∗∗ −0.127+ −0.119+
(0.051) (0.072) (0.071)
Immigrant × Male −0.139 −0.151
(0.103) (0.102)
Second Decision 0.199∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036)
Constant 2.416∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗ 2.513∗∗∗ 2.478∗∗∗ 2.371∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.027) (0.029) (0.038) (0.041)
N 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses (+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001).
systematically biased toward either natives or immigrants. In
contrast, we estimate that immigrant Alters received, on average,
0.29 EUR less than their share of the even split. This estimate
is statistically significant at p < 0.001, and is also substantively
much larger than the effects we uncover in the DG and TG.
Overall, we find partial evidence in favor of H1: while we
detect no discrimination when it comes to pro-social behavior as
captured in the DG, discrimination does appear with regards to
trust (in the TG) and in whether resources should go to natives
or immigrants (in the SG).
To test H2, we rely on the fact that respondents were randomly
paired with female vs. male Alters in the DG and TG. Since
TABLE 3 | Amount of Money (in EUR) sent to Alter in the Trust Games.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrant Alter -0.130∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.011
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.053) (0.052)
Male Alter -0.218∗∗∗ -0.091 -0.098
(0.043) (0.062) (0.061)
Immigrant × Male -0.253∗∗ -0.242∗∗
(0.089) (0.088)
Second Decision -0.176∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031)
Constant 2.865∗∗∗ 2.956∗∗∗ 2.972∗∗∗ 2.910∗∗∗ 3.003∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.024) (0.028) (0.035) (0.039)
N 2486 2486 2486 2486 2486
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses (∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001).
the ethnicity and gender of Alters in the DG and TG were
fully crossed, we include an ethnicity × gender interaction term
to test whether male immigrants are the subject of greater
discrimination than female immigrants. The results are presented
graphically in Figure 4, while the estimated coefficients are
presented in Models 3–5 of Tables 2, 3.
Turning first to the DG results, Model 3 of Table 2 shows
that male Alters (of any ethnicity) receive offers around
0.20 EUR lower (p < 0.001). However, when interacting
Alters’ gender and immigrant status (Model 4), we see no
additional penalty for male immigrants [the difference in
margins natives and male immigrants is insignificant at p = 0.11
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Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses (∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001).
(see Table S4 with margins in Supplementary Materials)].
Again, this result is robust to controlling for order
effects (Model 5).
Next we turn to results in the TG (see Models 3–5 of Table 3).
Here Model 3 shows that, in addition to the main effect of
discrimination against immigrant Alters discussed above, there
is also a penalty for male Alters, who receive on average 0.22
EUR less than females (p < 0.001). However, both main effects
lose significance once an interaction term is included in Model
4. In other words, it appears that the lower trust shown toward
both immigrants and men is driven by reactions toward male
immigrants, who are estimated to receive 0.25 EUR less thanmale
natives8. As before, these results are also robust to controls for
decision order (Model 5)9.
Finally, turning to the SG, recall that participants were
randomized into seeing either (a) native female vs. immigrant
female Alters or (b) native male vs. immigrant male Alters. Thus,
we can examine the extent of gender specific discrimination
by comparing splits in (a) vs. (b). The results are shown in
Model 2 of Table 4 and presented graphically in Figure 4. The
constant term in Model 2 now represents the deviation from an
even split in (a), while the coefficient on male alters indicates
the extent to which distributions in (b) differ from this all-
female baseline. The coefficient on male Alters is substantively
small and statistically insignificant, which indicates no additional
gender-specific discrimination in the SG.
Overall, we find partial evidence in support of H2. In the
strategic interaction environment of the Trust Game, host
population members discriminate against immigrant men, while
immigrant women face no such discrimination. In contrast, no
gender-specific penalty is observed in the non-strategic games.
Neither the DG (no discrimination against either gender) nor
the SG (equal discrimination against both genders) support the
hypothesis that male immigrants are particularly likely to be the
targets of prejudice.
8They also receive 0.35 EUR less than native women, and 0.34 EUR less than
immigrant women. See margins in Table S5 in the Supplementary Material.
9We also explore a specific variant of H2, namely that there could be gender-
specific differences in gender-discrimination. To that effect, we estimate a three-
way interaction effect with respondent’s gender, gender of alter and immigrant
status for the trust game, which is the only game in which we find gendered
discrimination against immigrant alters. Briefly, we find no significant differences
in discrimination against male immigrants between female and male respondents.
Please refer to Tables S6 and S7 and Figure S1 in the Supplementary Materials for
more information.
5. DISCUSSION
Recent migration from Muslim-majority countries has
sparked discussions across Europe and the U.S. about the
supposed threat posed by new immigrants (Adida et al., 2019;
Valentino et al., 2019; Helbling and Traunmüller, 2020). Our
study presents results from a large-scale online survey with
residents of Germany’s eastern regions that included several
behavioral games designed to capture pro-social behavior
and discrimination against immigrant men and women from
Muslim-majority countries.
Our study makes three contributions to the literature on
discrimination of immigrants and ethnic minorities. The first
contribution concerns the study setting: Our study is set in a fairly
common and politically important context where anti-immigrant
sentiments are generally high but which is rarely studied. We
use a unique sample of rural respondents in the five eastern
German Bundesländer, which is more general than the samples
typically employed in experimental studies on discrimination,
prejudice and stereotyping. Of course, our sampling strategy may
have biased us toward the identification of discrimination since
anti-immigrant attitudes are generally more pronounced in non-
urban areas. However, given the structural similarity of our study
region to other rural areas in Germany and Europe, our findings
may extend to similar settings in which there is strong anti-
immigrant sentiment. However, it remains to be tested in future
work whether our findings replicate and generalize beyond this
context and population.
Second, we highlight and systematically examine the role
of gendered ethnic discrimination against immigrants and
ethnic minorities, which has so far received little attention
among social scientists. Our results complement those of
Ward (2019) who finds low levels of support for groups
of young male refugees in Germany, which he argues is
driven by perceptions of young men as cultural and security
threats. In Germany, many of the recent refugee arrivals
were young and male, which has resulted in a growing
imbalance in the gender ratio and increased the competition
for female partners. This competitive situation in the mating
market has been identified as a critical factor driving hate
crimes against refugees (Dancygier et al., 2020) and highlights
the importance of studying gender dynamics in immigrant
discrimination research. However, one limitation of our study
is that by design (since all our Alters are from Muslim-
majority cultures) we are unable to disentangle between an
outgroup bias against Muslim and non-Muslim immigrant men.
Future research should therefore test the boundaries of this
outgroup bias.
Finally, our study adds to a handful of articles using
behavioral games to measure ingroup favoritism and study
discrimination against immigrants and ethnic minorities in
European societies (Adida et al., 2016; Cettolin and Suetens,
2019). Behavioral games are useful in the study of discrimination
because they allow us to tease apart mechanisms. We focus
on strategic and non-strategic pro-social behavior with respect
to gendered ethnic discrimination. We find mixed evidence
for gendered ethnic discrimination in this paper. While
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FIGURE 4 | The difference in the amount of money (in EUR) shared with immigrants compared to natives for male and female Alters in three behavioral games: the
Dictator Game, the Trust Game, and the Split Game. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
we find that natives are similarly pro-social toward men
and women of immigrant origin in non-strategic situations,
we also observe that natives are significantly less likely to
trust immigrant men in strategic encounters. Importantly,
our results suggest that gendered ethnic discrimination is
not simply taste-based (Becker, 1957) since in this case we
should observe discrimination in the non-strategic DG and
SG. Instead, gendered ethnic discrimination appears to be
driven by an unwillingness among natives to trust male
immigrants. However, a limitation of the current study that
future research should address is to better understand how
our treatment effects are moderated by personality factors,
such as authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950) or implicit
biases (Rudman and Ashmore, 2007), which may differ across
individual respondents. The estimation of such heterogeneous
treatment effects may shed light on the social-psychological
mechanisms underlying our results.
Overall, our results call for a better understanding of the
conditions under which discrimination occurs with respect
to pro-social behaviors and the need to develop a theory
for understanding immigrant discrimination that takes into
account the differences in reception faced by male and
female immigrants.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The dataset generated for this study can be found in the Havard
Dataverse Project Gereke, Johanna, 2020, “Replication Data
for Gendered discrimination against immigrants,” https://
doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G0W9MH, Harvard Dataverse, V1,
UNF:6:xGkgR2Q+V62Qd+0mulJdoQ== [fileUNF].
ETHICS STATEMENT
Written informed consent was obtained from the individuals
for the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data
included in this article.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
JG, MS, and DB designed research. MS and JG performed
research and analyzed data. JG wrote the first draft of the
manuscript. MS wrote sections of the manuscript. All authors
contributed to manuscript revision, read and approved the
submitted version.
FUNDING
Funding for this project was provided by the European Research
Council (Grant No 639584) and by the Ministry of Science,
Research and the Arts Baden-Württemberg and the University
of Mannheim.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Wewould like to thankNan Zhang and JoshuaHellyer for helpful
feedback and Thomas Ritter and his team from the CATI Lab at
the University of Jena for their data collection efforts.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2020.
00059/full#supplementary-material
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 59
Gereke et al. Gendered Discrimination Against Immigrants
REFERENCES
Abascal, M. (2015). Us and them: Black-white relations in the wake
of hispanic population growth. Am. Sociol. Rev. 80, 789–813.
doi: 10.1177/0003122415587313
Adida, C. L., Laitin, D. D., and Valfort, M.-A. (2016). Why Muslim Integration
Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
doi: 10.4159/9780674088962
Adida, C. L., Lo, A., and Platas, M. R. (2019). Americans preferred Syrian
refugees who are female, English-speaking, and Christian on the eve of
Donald Trump’s election. PLoS ONE 14:e0222504. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.
0222504
Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., and Sanford, R. N. (1950). The
Authoritarian Personality. New York, NY: Harpers.
Alba, R., and Foner, N. (2017). Immigration and the geography of polarization.
City Commun. 16, 239–243. doi: 10.1111/cico.12241
Baldassarri, D., and Abascal, M. (2017). Field experiments
across the social sciences. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 43, 41–73.
doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112445
Baldassarri, D., Gereke, J., and Schaub, M. (2020). “Selection, discrimination and
deference in the interactions between Italians and immigrants,” in Working
Paper.
Balliet, D., Wu, J., and De Dreu, C. K. (2014). Ingroup favoritism in
cooperation: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 140:1556. doi: 10.1037/a00
37737
Becker, G. S. (1957). The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago, IL: Chicago Press.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and
social history. Games Econ. Behav. 10, 122–142. doi: 10.1006/game.19
95.1027
Bouckaert, J., and Dhaene, G. (2004). Inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity: results
of an experiment with small businessmen. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 20, 869–886.
doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.08.006
Bourabain, D., and Verhaeghe, P.-P. (2019). Could you help me, please?
Intersectional field experiments on everyday discrimination in clothing
stores. J. Ethnic Migrat. Stud. 45, 2026–2044. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.
1480360
Camerer, C. F. (2011). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic
Interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cettolin, E., and Suetens, S. (2019). Return on trust is lower for immigrants. Econ.
J. 129, 1992–2009. doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12629
Chen, D. L., Schonger,M., andWickens, C. (2016). oTree–an open-source platform
for laboratory, online, and field experiments. J. Behav. Exp. Fin. 9, 88–97.
doi: 10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001
Choi, D. D., Poertner, M., and Sambanis, N. (2019). Parochialism, social norms,
and discrimination against immigrants. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 116,
16274–16279. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1820146116
Coleman, J. S. (1994). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Czymara, C. S., and Schmidt-Catran, A. W. (2017). Refugees unwelcome?
Changes in the public acceptance of immigrants and refugees in Germany
in the course of Europe’s ‘immigration crisis’. Eur. Sociol. Rev. 33, 735–751.
doi: 10.1093/esr/jcx071
Dancygier, R. M., Egami, N., Jamal, A., and Rischke, R. (2020). Hate crimes and
gender imbalances: fears over mate competition and violence against refugees.
Am. J. Political Sci. Forthcoming. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3358780
Drouhot, L. G., and Nee, V. (2019). Assimilation and the second generation
in Europe and America: blending and segregating social dynamics
between immigrants and natives. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 45, 177–199.
doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-073117-041335
Eurostat (2017). Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants.
Eurostat (2018). Asyl und Gesteuerte Migration.
Feltes, T., List, K., and Bertamini, M. (2018). “More refugees, more
offenders, more crime? Critical comments with data from Germany,”
in Refugees and Migrants in Law and Policy, eds H. Kury and
S. Redo (Berlin: Springer), 599–624. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-721
59-0_26
Frey, A. (2020). ‘Cologne changed everything’—The effect of threatening events on
the frequency and distribution of intergroup conflict in Germany. Eur. Sociol.
Rev. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcaa007. [Epub ahead of print].
Gambetta, D., and Hertog, S. (2017). Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection
Between Violent Extremism and Education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press. doi: 10.2307/j.ctvc779ns
Geiges, L. (2018). Wie die afd im kontext der flüchtlingskrise
mobilisierte. eine empirisch-qualitative untersuchung der herbstoffensive
2015. Z. Politikwissenschaft 28, 49–69. doi: 10.1007/s41358-018-
0126-3
Gereke, J., Schaub, M., and Baldassarri, D. (2018). Ethnic diversity, poverty and
social trust in Germany: evidence from a behavioral measure of trust. PLoSONE
13:e0199834. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0199834
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., and Soutter, C. L.
(2000). Measuring trust. Q. J. Econ. 115, 811–846. doi: 10.1162/003355300
554926
Hangartner, D., Dinas, E., Marbach, M., Matakos, K., and Xefteris, D. (2019). Does
exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile? Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.
113, 442–455. doi: 10.1017/S0003055418000813
Haug, S., Müssig, S., and Stichs, A. (2009). Muslim life in Germany: A Study
Conducted on Behalf of the German Conference on Islam. Federal Office for
Migration and Refugees.
Helbling, M., and Traunmüller, R., (2020). What is Islamophobia? Disentangling
citizens’ feelings toward ethnicity, religion and religiosity using a survey
experiment. Brit. J. Polit. Sci. 50, 811–828. doi: 10.1017/S0007123418000054
Higgins, A. (2015). Norway offers migrants a lesson in how to treat women.
N. Y. Times 19:2015. Available online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/
20/world/europe/norway-offers-migrants-a-lesson-in-how-to-treat-women.
html
Inglehart, R., and Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Koopmans, R. (2016). Does assimilation work? Sociocultural determinants of
labour market participation of European Muslims. J. Ethnic Migrat. Stud. 42,
197–216. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2015.1082903
Navarrete, C. D., McDonald,M.M.,Molina, L. E., and Sidanius, J. (2010). Prejudice
at the nexus of race and gender: an outgroupmale target hypothesis. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 98:933. doi: 10.1037/a0017931
Oakes, P. J., and Turner, J. C. (1980). Social categorization and intergroup
behaviour: does minimal intergroup discrimination make social identity
more positive? Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 10, 295–301. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420
100307
OECD (2017). Finding Their Way. Labour Market Integration of Refugees in
Germany.
Peterson, B. D. (2016). “Social identification and in-group favoritism: measuring
the strength of group ties,” inWorking Paper.
Rudman, L. A., and Ashmore, R. D. (2007). Discrimination and the
implicit association test. Group Process. Intergroup Relat. 10, 359–372.
doi: 10.1177/1368430207078696
Schaub, M. (2017). Threat and parochialism in intergroup relations: lab-
in-the-field evidence from rural Georgia. Proc. R. Soc. B 284:20171560.
doi: 10.1098/rspb.2017.1560
Schaub, M., Gereke, J., and Baldassarri, D. (2020a). Does poverty undermine
cooperation in multiethnic settings? Evidence from a cooperative
investment experiment. J. Exp. Polit. Sci. 7, 27–40. doi: 10.1017/XPS.
2019.19
Schaub, M., Gereke, J., and Baldassarri, D. (2020b). Strangers in hostile
lands: exposure to refugees and right-wing support. Comp. Political Stud.
Forthcoming.
Stephan, W. G., and Stephan, C. W. (2018). “Intergroup threat theory,” in The
International Encyclopedia of Intercultural Communication, ed Y. Yun Kim
(Wiley Blackwell), 1–12. doi: 10.1002/9781118783665.ieicc0162
Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., and Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative
theory of intergroup conflict. Organ. Ident. Reader 56:65.
Todorov, A., Olivola, C. Y., Dotsch, R., and Mende-Siedlecki, P.
(2015). Social attributions from faces: determinants, consequences,
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 9 September 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 59
Gereke et al. Gendered Discrimination Against Immigrants
accuracy, and functional significance. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 66, 519–545.
doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143831
Valentino, N. A., Soroka, S. N., Iyengar, S., Aalberg, T., Duch, R., Fraile,
M., et al. (2019). Economic and cultural drivers of immigrant support
worldwide. Brit. J. Polit. Sci. 49, 1201–1226. doi: 10.1017/S0007123417
00031X
Ward, D. G. (2019). Public attitudes toward young immigrant men.
Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 113, 264–269. doi: 10.1017/S00030554180
00710
Winter, F., and Zhang, N. (2018). Social norm enforcement in ethnically
diverse communities. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 115, 2722–2727.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1718309115
Yamagishi, T., and Mifune, N. (2008). Does shared
group membership promote altruism? Fear, greed, and
reputation. Ration. Soc. 20, 5–30. doi: 10.1177/104346310708
5442
Zhang, N., Aidenberger, A., Rauhut, H., andWinter, F. (2019). Prosocial behaviour
in interethnic encounters: evidence from a field experiment with high-and
low-status immigrants. Eur. Sociol. Rev. 35, 582–597. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcz030
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Gereke, Schaub and Baldassarri. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 10 September 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 59
